Philosophy of Law: A Defense of Retributivism In the field of philosophy, the concept of "desert" suggests the status of deserving a particular response based on a previous action. The term is often invoked in conversations dealing with guilt and justice. However, philosophers disagree about whether desert justifies reactive behaviors such as punishment or revenge. This debate is particularly significant in the context of a legal system that purports to punish criminals in a manner consistent with their crimes. This article considers the desert arguments raised to support retributivism, or retribution. Retributivism is "the application of the desert principle to the special case of criminal punishment". Russ Shafer-Landau and James Rachels offer very different perspectives on moral worthiness that ground their different views on the appropriate response to wrongful acts. In “The Failure of Retributivism,” Shafer-Landau argues that retributivism fails to function as a comprehensive theoretical foundation for the legal use of punishment. In contrast, in his article “Punishment and Desert,” Rachels uses the four principles of blame, equal treatment, proportionality, and apology to illustrate the superiority of punishment as a basis for the justice system over two alternatives: deterrence and rehabilitation. Their philosophical treatment of the term leads to disagreements about the justification of legal punishment. Ultimately, Rachels offers a more compelling vision of the desert than Shafer-Landau and, as a result, better justifies her support for a system of retributive justice. Shafer-Landau, moral desert and retributivism Shafer-Landau begins his article by arguing that three considerations lay the foundation for d...... middle of paper ......ributivism. Until humans have the ability to ensure that an innocent person can never be executed for a crime committed by someone else, a ban on executions may be the most morally justified response. Conclusion Ultimately, Rachels offers a more comprehensive consideration of different potential interpretations of moral desert. His comparison of three legal responses using four distinguishing values ​​makes it very clear to the reader that, despite concerns about the value of moral merit, punishment is the most desirable option currently available to the criminal justice system. His assessment of retributivism, deterrence, and rehabilitation responds to Shafer-Landau's central claim that a comparative assessment of retributivism could not be made in a short article. Furthermore, Rachels' argument is more pragmatic and makes intuitive sense to those who can make it