The United States was unprepared for the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor due to the nascent intelligence community's inability to determine the time and place of the attack . The issue of attack prevention is beyond the scope of an intelligence agency, such action is the product of politics. That said, the intelligence community provided the President with insufficient information to mitigate U.S. losses on the eve of U.S. entry into World War II. This outcome was not entirely the responsibility of the underfunded and undersupported military and intelligence assets working on the ground. The treatment of US intelligence assets during the interwar period set them up for failure when the test came, and Washington's failure to recognize these shortcomings, even as the threat of attack became increasingly clear, is ultimately to blame by Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short's insufficient defense position. It is unrealistic and dangerous to assume the possibility of omniscience on the part of any intelligence service, and it is doubly foolish to rely on an intelligence apparatus that is clearly under-resourced for the challenges it would face. The narrative of an intelligence failure as the cause of Pearl Harbor is appealing, conveniently scapegoating little-known groups to the advantage of the nation's short-sighted defense policy makers. It is also understandable that the attack was unexpected by the American public and gave the initiative to the Japanese. The attack was a blow to American pride, especially when it came from an “inferior race,” such as the Japanese, who were considered “cultured and polite” to the point of being essentially harmless before the war. do not inhibit… middle of paper… avy Cryptology: The Early Days.” Accessed September 19, 2011. www.nsa.gov.Center for Cryptologic History. “Review of Pearl Harbor – Signal Intelligence Service.” Accessed September 19, 2011. www.nsa.gov.Ford, Harold P. “The Primary Purpose of the National Estimate.” Washington, DC: The Defense Intelligence College, 1989.McRaven, William H. Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare. New York: Presidio Press, 1995.Parker, Frederick D. Pearl Harbor Revisited. (Washington, DC: Naval History Center, 1994) Piacine, Robert F. "Pearl Harbor: Intelligence Failure?" Master's thesis, Air War College, 1997. Prange, Gordon W., Donald M. Goldstein, and Katherine V. Dillon. At dawn we slept. New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991.Northridge, AR “Pearl Harbor: Estimating Then and Now.” Accessed September 19, 2011. www.cia.gov.