The atomic policy against Japan was closely linked to the fear of Soviet expansion in Asia. US leaders were keenly aware of Russia's agreement at Yalta to join the war against Japan three months after Germany's surrender on May 7, 1945 (Fogelman, 124). During the U.S. invasion of Japan planned for November 1, 1945, U.S. officials were dubious about the cooperative mission with Russia in which Russia would have power at the peace table. However, the successful detonation of Alamogordo had transformed everything. The bomb ensured that the United States no longer needed Russian help to win in the Pacific (Wainstock, 132). In reality, Russian involvement now would only threaten postwar American interests. If successful, the atomic bomb would have had clear long-term political and diplomatic repercussions. Nearly all of the president's top advisors agreed on the issue (Robert Jay Lifton, 216). The general agreement was that the bomb would be a radically new force in influencing American politics and addressing numerous problems of the postwar world. Second war in Asia. Racist beliefs about the Japanese reached a fever pitch in the aftershock of the destructive surprise attack on Pearl Harbor (Maddox, 138). Americans began to classify World War II as two very different wars, the Pacific War and the European War. In Europe, Hitler and the Nazis were identified as enemies and distinguished from the German people as a whole. On the other hand, in the Pacific, American antagonism was usually directed at the entire Japanese race or the “Japs,” as they were called. Throughout the war, during paper negotiations with the Soviets, the bomb had the opposite result. Soon after Hiroshima, Stalin ordered Soviet nuclear scientists to catch up with the technology obtained by their rivals, starting the race for world domination (Alperovitz, 416). The Soviets successfully tested their first atomic bomb on September 23, 1949; and the transition to the atomic age had been established (Alperovitz, 419). One thing is clear; the atomic bomb was not necessary to win the Pacific War. However, the dominant claim in both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations was that the bomb would be used against the enemy. The bomb served a dual role: quickly ending the war and establishing US hegemony throughout the world. However, the serious repercussions of using the bomb are far greater than the weapon's achievement in ending World War II..