The rise to power of China and India makes us think of a world in which it will not only seem less American, but it will also seem less liberal. Not only will the importance of the United States die, but so will its open, rules-based international order that the country has adopted since the 1940s. In this view, new powerful states are beginning to advance their own ideas and programs for the global order, and the weakened United States will find it more difficult to defend the old system. Here we take it for granted that the liberal world order is being modified and not completely dissolved. Imagine a world where China is the hegemonic power and pushes the world order towards a more autocratic world order, both politically and economically. Completely rejecting the old model, thus questioning a set of liberal ideas such as belief in democratization, trust in the free market and the acceptability of US military power. In my opinion this is a narrative of the panic scenario. Even if America loses its supremacy, it will leave behind the liberal world order, resulting in growth of economic and security interdependence among nations such as China, India, Brazil, Russia. The liberal world order will adapt to survive. This adaptation will make it more economically feasible, which is what both nations are aiming for. So China and India would not contest the current order at all but would like to gain authority within it. Both nations will benefit from rules, practices and institutions such as the WTO and the G20. Their economic prosperity is often linked to the liberal organization of world politics. The liberal world order is not only a collection of liberal democracies but is also rather a political club, offering ... middle of paper ... .dress, i.e. insecurity and conflict. As far as India-China relations are concerned, Nehruvians argue that other areas of interaction should not be held hostage by the border issue as economic dependence transcends them. In summary, power is a zero-sum game, and any attempt to improve the position of China and India would cost others some of their influence. Although offensive realism expressed in zero-sum terms would argue that one power will inevitably rise at the cost of the other, the theory of interdependence advocated by liberal institutionalism indicates that great power relations can be managed without breaking out in a devastating war. What is important, in the end, is that we do not have a single way of managing great power relationships; commitment, bandwagoning and balance go hand in hand and are necessary political tools for states to address an increasingly anarchic international order.