The Platonic conception of human nature followed by Descartes does not consider man as a unity in being. [1] According to Platonic views, man is not really one thing but is two things. He has a mind and a body and they are not interconnected with each other. Both the body and the soul are not united with each other in the unity of existence. I did some research on Thomistic epistemology and found it fascinating, such as how Aquinas rejects the notion of mind-body dualism that Wilhelmsen uses to construct his arguments. While I am the same opposite as Whilhelmsen in agreeing with the Thomistic view of monism, I understand that Aquinas does not address the issues handled in this cutting-edge philosophical sub-discipline with regards to their relevance in resolving the "mind question -body". no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay No such problem existed in the time of Thomas Aquinas, and for him critical sophistication was not between mind and body anyway, but rather between soul and body. Indeed, even this is plausibly deceptive, in any case, since Aquinas does not mean by "soul" what many contemporary so-called philosophers tend to mean by it, namely an irrelevant substance of the kind advocated by Descartes. However, the way Descartes explains mind-body dualism is completely misleading. As the author mentions in his book about the example of the ship and the helmsman and how the notion of unity being separate between mind and body is fallible. The ship could exist without a helmsman, and the helmsman could remain the same without a ship. [2] As explained by Wilhelmsen, certainly mind and body are considered as a unity and are not two separate things. Although there is some discussion among Christians about anthropological dualism, most Christian scholars have tended to recognize a Thomistic dualism. As I read, I embarked on a new journey in search of our dualism of man. As I read, I embarked on a new journey to discover whether Aquinas's approach can be called dualistic. Although there is some discussion among Christians about anthropological dualism, most Christian scholars tend to recognize a Thomistic dualism of man, in which there is a mixture of both material and insignificant substance and that the two substances are present in similar way in humans. This view is in opposition to the Cartesian perspective of man, which teaches that man is largely irrelevant and that the physicality of man is almost a reconsideration of what comprises man. [3]Wilhelmsen was very clear in rejecting mind-body dualism and idolizing the monistic notion that soul-body are the same and are a single unity. By saying this, he not only rejects the dualistic nature of human thinking, but also the materialistic nature. Rather, Aquinas considers what is currently called "intentionality" as the unmistakable element of the psyche, and what at a fundamental level is difficult to clarify in materialistic terms. Meanwhile, he does not consider intentionality in the remarkable way that contemporary scholars do. Furthermore, although he is not a realist, he is also not a Cartesian dualist, since his view is in some respects central among these choices. It is clear that Aquinas rejects the Cartesian or Platonic type of dualism. On the other hand, Thomas clearly seems to be somewhere in the dualist camp since he thinks there is an immaterial, subsistent constituent of the subject of cognitive function. [4] Specifically, Aquinas argues that human acuity is insignificant.