More than thirty million Kurds live as distressed ethnic minorities enduring varying degrees of political, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural discrimination in a geographic space that includes Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. The territories claimed in the aforementioned countries are defined by Kurdish nationalists as "Greater Kurdistan". Countries hosting Kurdish nationalists are often subject to separatist aspirations and face constant threats to their respective territorial integrity. The United States exploited the Kurdish invasion of Iraq after 2003 as one of its main tools to project power in the region. My research paper will explain why Iraqi Kurdish nationalism has been in steady decline since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay Iran maintains significant influence in Iraq, not only with the central government in Baghdad, but also with the Kurds. Therefore, as Iraqi Kurdish nationalism continues to decline due to a lack of U.S. support and recognition of Kurdish independence, the United States will face difficulties in attempting to project power in the region. Former US ambassador to Iraq from 2007 to 2009, Ryan Crocker, argues that the US appears to be taking Baghdad's side in the dispute with the Kurds. The central government in Baghdad is dominated by Shiite Muslims and is therefore supported by Iran. As tensions between the United States and Iran continue to rise, the United States will lose the ability to exploit the Kurds for power projection. Furthermore, Crocker argues that the situation “is for the Kurds and the Iraqis to work out, but by putting us on one side, the concern is that we will no longer be seen as an honest broker as we move forward.” Despite conflicting interests between the United States, Iran, Türkiye, Syria and other Middle Eastern countries all share a common goal: stability in Iraq. The decline of Iraqi Kurdish nationalism has created the prospects of further conflict within Iraq. Three states will be used to explain the decline of Iraqi Kurdish nationalism: the United States, Iraq and Iran. The United States will be a push factor, which will attempt to support Kurdish nationalism for US national security. Iran and Turkey will be used as pull factors, effectively declaring war on Kurdish nationalism to protect their central government's control. Using Iran and Iraq, I hope to highlight that the decline of Kurdish nationalism is largely due to a lack of independence from the international community. Furthermore, we see disagreements among scholars about which country (Iran, Iraq, the United States, etc.) had the greatest influence on Kurdish nationalism. Finally, I will examine the internal workings of Kurdish society and how it has changed after 2003, for example through dependence on party networks and power dynamics between classes, generations and genders. I hope to highlight that the emergence of localized identities, largely due to regional unrest, has hindered a unified Kurdish nationalistic identity and mobilization. The combination of forces external and internal to Kurdish nationalism complicates the attempt to uncover the driving force behind the decline of Kurdish nationalism after 2003. I will first examine the Iraqi central government as a factor in Kurdish nationalism. The Iraqi central government's perspective has been, and still is, that Kurdish succession would represent a direct challenge to Baghdad's authority. However, the Iraqi central government had to deal withsignificant challenges following the US invasion, namely the decimation of the Iraqi army by US forces. Additionally, Iraq faced a financial crisis, sectarian conflict, political divisions, a fledgling economy, and an inability to provide daily services to its citizens due to decades of war. Iraq's central government is also susceptible to regional regimes, such as Iran's economic and military actions should Iraq grant sovereignty to the Kurds. Second, I will examine Iran as a factor in Kurdish nationalism. Iran is primarily concerned that granting Kurdish independence to Iraq will embolden its large domestic population of repressed Kurds. If Iraq were to grant independence to the Kurds, Iran could benefit through economic development and political reforms, effectively extending control over the new regional state. On the other hand, a sudden unilateral announcement of Kurdish independence could lead to a crackdown against the Kurds inside Iran. The effort, led by the Iranian government, would be aimed at quashing any hopes of Kurdish-Iranian independence. Third, I will examine the United States as a factor in Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds in Iraq mostly align themselves with Washington's values ​​simply because they want to expel the central Iraqi government. The reasoning is simple: without a central Iraqi government, the Kurds will be able to fill the power vacuum and achieve independence. However, the Iraqi government newly formed by the United States after the 2003 invasion did not grant the Kurds full independence. Rather, he gave the Kurds a more visible role in the new central government (created in 2004), such as control of the positions of army chief of staff, foreign minister, and finance minister. Despite these new powers, Kurdish political influence began to decline soon after 2004 due to the emergence of an Arab-Kurdish rivalry for internal control of Iraq. For example, as Sunni and Shia political parties became more organized, Kurdish influence was diluted and the implementation of constitutional provisions was delayed. Most constitutional provisions would have granted the Kurds concessions on controversial issues. In particular, Article 140 of the new post-invasion Iraqi constitution of 2003 provided for a referendum to resolve disagreements over disputed territories. It was never implemented. Thus, while many American government representatives argue that support for the Kurds is critical to regional stability, the United States failed to secure Kurdish independence during the post-invasion power vacuum of 2003. This lack of support of the United States had a direct impact on the decline of Kurdish nationalism after 2003. In 2015, the president of the Kurdish region of Iraq, Masoud Barzani, said: “The time has come to decide our fate, and we should not wait for them to be others to decide it for us." Finally, I will examine changes in Kurdish internal identity. It can be argued that the turbulence in the region has led the international community to view Kurdistan as a relatively stable area. However, the unrest has created divergent opinions even within the Kurds. Localized identities and regional autonomy began to emerge after the 2003 US invasion, which prevented the mobilization of a unified Kurdish identity. We witness the rise of localized parties that have deliberately fueled social fragmentation “in order to manipulate the anti-establishment sentiments of the population into forms of pressure on rival leaders of local parties”. In Kurdistan there are strong identities