Judges have varying levels of deference to these decisions which are awarded based on their assessment of an issue. According to the HRA, it is argued that judges “have a duty of minimal deference to parliamentary decision-making…, but substantial deference is only exceptionally owed. “Judges can give weight to Parliament; however they often still leave room for one's own evaluation. Parliamentary sovereignty does not allow judges to not follow acts of Parliament, however the HRA allows them to treat legislation as weighty, but never so authoritative, allowing them to interpret it loosely enough that it no longer resembles it. In R v A, LJ Hope stated that section 3 “is merely a rule of interpretation” which draws a distinction between the making of judicial and legislative law; however, this differentiation does not change the fact that courts continue to make significant changes to the law. LJ Nicholls, in Ghaidan v Godin Mendoza, said: “The precise form of the words read for this purpose has no meaning. What matters is the substantial effect. The court ignored House of Lords precedent and effectively changed the law. Before 1999 the only institution capable of doing this would have been Parliament. The powers of interpretation acquired by the courts are directly contrary to parliamentary sovereignty and give the courts the power to oppose acts of Parliament. In the case of Jackson v Attorney General, there was an obiter which suggested that there are limits to parliamentary sovereignty: "Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if ever it were absolute" by LJ Hope, who goes on to say, "the fact that your Lordships have been willing to hear this appeal… is another indication that the courts have a role to play in defining the limits of Parliament's legislative authority.